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1. Introduction  
 
The Global Financial Crisis of 2007-08 started in the US with the collapse of the subprime 
mortgage market in early 2007. It was the result of years of rising policy interest rates, major 
changes in (de)regulation, lax oversight and a prolonged period of artificially low interest rates 
(Bordo, 2008). The world was on the brink of a second Great Depression; economic output, 
global trade and global equity prices all plummeted lower than they did in 1929 at the onset of 
the Great Depression (Eichengreen and O’Rourke, 2009). While an economic collapse was 
avoided, most of the global economies plunged into what is conventionally referred to as the 
“Great Recession” (Barr, 2012). By now, the colossal damage left by the global financial crisis 
of 2007-08 has been well documented. It caused the largest contraction of the global economy 
since World War II, asset and credit markets experienced major disruptions, economies faced 
an unprecedented rise in bankruptcies and, more generally, unfathomable amounts of money 
evaporated (Claessens et al., 2010, 1-2). The International Monetary Fund (IMF) calculated 
that financial institutions lost more than $4 trillion of their holdings as a direct result of the 
crisis (2009, 11). About a year passed before the eruption of the subprime crisis in the US 
reached Europe’s shores (Eichengreen, 2015, 164); while at first there was little concern about 
European sovereign debt, the asymmetric effects of the global financial shock soon exposed 
the reliance of (some) European countries on short-term cross-border financial flows. When 
this dried up, the whole Eurozone plunged into a recession and the European Central Bank 
(ECB), together with the IMF, scrambled to construct a coherent policy response (Lane, 2012, 
55-60).  
 
Ultimately, as was the case after the Great Depression, the Great Recession impacted middle 
and low income families considerably more than those who inflicted it upon the global 
economy. People lost their homes, their jobs and their savings; the International Labour 
Organization (ILO) estimated that between 2007-2009, unemployment increased by 34 million 
people (2010, 10). Barry Eichengreen (2002) and Charles Kindleberger (1973) note that 
financial crises are complementary to the operation of financial markets and, present 
considerably more risk to the economy than standard business-cycles downturns. Over the 
period 1970-2011, 147 banking crises, 218 currency crises and 66 sovereign crises have been 
identified in the banking crises database and importantly, the most recent crises are shown to 
be the costliest in terms of fiscal outlays and output losses (Laeven and Valencia, 2012, 3).  
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Daniel Drezner (1968-) 
Despite all this, Daniel Drezner, an American Professor of International Politics at the Fletcher 
School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University and a non-resident senior fellow at the 
Brookings Institution, argues that Global Economic Governance (GEG) was effective in 
assisting the recovery process following the 2008 global financial crisis. In fact, Drezner 
plainly states: “In short, the system worked.” (2014, 13). Drezner argues that whether one looks 
at global economic outcomes, policy outputs or institutional resilience, the global governance 
structures either reinforced or improved upon the pre-crisis status quo after the collapse of 
subprime mortgage bubble (2014, 32). In doing so, Drezner defies conventional wisdom: most 
disappointment with the performance of the global economy and policymakers’ response 
(Cohen, 2014, 587). Drezner collects and analyses a wealth of empirical evidence to show that 
a second Great Depression was avoided because global economic governance functioned 
effectively to maintain economic openness and built resiliency into the system. To be clear, 
Drezner presents an argument of a particular view, in his own words: “I do not rigorously test 
competing hypotheses, nor do I develop a formal theory of governance. Instead, I make an 
empirical assertion that is heavily contested in the public sphere.” (2014, 40). Drezner’s 
argument relies on a two observations or case studies –the Global Financial Crisis of 2007-08 
and the Great Depression of the 1930s– and extrapolates his findings into his assertion that 
GEG “worked”.  
 
Thesis outline 
In this thesis I argue that while an economic collapse has been averted, the performance of the 
global economy has been disappointing and global economic governance has not improved the 
recovery after the financial crisis. I object to both Drezner’s normative assumptions and do 
question the explanatory power of his empirical findings, therefore, this thesis consists of two 
parts. Firstly, a normative challenge to Drezner’s assumptions for establishing the baselines for 
comparison in order to evaluate GEG-performance: (1) the Great Depression and the Great 
Recession have many parallels, but this certainly does not warrant comparing the policy 
response then to the latest policy response and, (2) Drezner’s disregard for the role of “the 
system” before and after the crisis. The second part challenges Drezner’s empirical findings: 
even using his own metrics, the resulting global economic performance contrasts Drezner’s 
conclusion with regard to the performance of the global economy. Therefore, the following 
central research question is constructed:  
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Did global economic governance actually work effectively before, during and after the 2007-
2008 financial crisis? A critical review 
 
How has the field of international political economy responded to Drezner’s work? Broadly 
speaking, the reactions to Drezner’s book focus on the the role of global economic governance, 
and Drezner’s measurement standards. Benjamin Cohen’s book review commends Drezner’s 
forceful arguments and applauds his maverick position despite the fact that Cohen 
fundamentally disagrees with Drezner’s conclusions (2015, 587). Cohen’s critique centres 
around Drezner’s normative assumptions; the Great Depression for measuring the global 
economic rebound does not present an objective baseline and, Drezner’s consistent reference 
to expectations in regard to economic and policy performance make for subjective 
argumentation. Another influential International Political Economy (IPE) scholar, Jonathan 
Kirshner (2014), also readily admits that the bar for establishing the performance of global 
economic governance does not present the full picture. Moreover, Kirshner addresses an 
important elephant in the room: the system worked much better for some than for others –just 
consider the fact that the most recognizable multinationals in the world were bailed out while 
millions of ordinary people were left out to dry. Additionally, Kirshner observes that “it is 
possible to look at the same outcomes and reach opposed conclusions” (2014), exactly the 
premise on which this research project is based. Consequently, the following central hypothesis 
is therefore constructed:  
 
Global Economic Governance performance was not effective before, during and after the 
Financial Crisis of 2007-08. 
 
The extensive guide to social research methods by Gary King, Robert Keohane and Sidney 
Verba considers choosing an accepted hypothesis that has not been adequately confirmed as 
an explicit contribution to the literature (1995, 16-17). Furthermore, they point to the 
importance of choosing a hypothesis seen as important by scholars in the field, but for which 
no one has completed a systematic study; whether the evidence points in favour or opposed to 
the selected hypothesis. Although prominent IPE scholars have openly criticized Drezner’s 
conclusions, no attempts at replication have been made up to this point. Finally, this bachelor 
thesis will incorporate insights from a related academic discipline, because the domain of 
global financial crises dictates a combined approach (Strange, 1998). King et al. suggest that 
Earvin M. van Ginkel | B.Sc. Thesis | Global Economic Institutions | June, 2017 
	
	
	
6 
theories designed for one literature that can be applied in another literature can provide valuable 
and original insights (1995). However, focussing too much on making a contribution to the 
scholarly literature without specific attention to topics that have real-world implications, runs 
the risk of examining politically insignificant questions (King et al., 1995, 17).  
 
Fortunately, examples of real-world implications of (global) financial crises are abundant and 
some can still be observed today. The first implication has to do with the government bailouts 
provided mostly to large financial institutions, referred to as “too-big-to-fail” institutions, at 
the peak of the crisis. These bailouts were financed with taxpayer money and while they did 
prevent the collapse of the financial system, this exposes the problem of moral hazard in the 
financial sector –excessive risk takers did not bear the full consequences of their actions. In 
March 2008, the US Federal Reserve Bank had to rescue Bear Stearns; in July 2008 the Federal 
Government had to support the Government Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs) Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac to prevent them from collapsing. In September 2008, the fourth-largest investment 
bank Lehman Brothers was allowed to go bankrupt, before effectively nationalising the largest 
insurance company in the world, AIG, through a $85 billion loan. This situation was certainly 
not just reserved to the US, policymakers in Europe faced similar and arguably even bigger 
problems in regard to the solvency of domestic financial intitutions. The second implication of 
this research topic concerns the employment developments. The latest edition of the World 
Employment Social Outlook: Trends 2017 published by the ILO also points to the significant 
prolonged economic and social consequences of the crises. The ILO predicts an increase in 
global unemployment levels by 3.4 million in 2017, contributing this mostly to the impacts of 
several sustained recessions in 2016 (2017, 3-5). Thirdly, as previously noted, the declines and 
losses caused by the GFC were not distributed evenly. While large, absolute, amounts of wealth 
were destroyed at the top of the distribution of wealth, households at the bottom of the wealth 
distribution lost the largest share of their wealth. As a result, wealth inequality has increased 
significantly, illustrated by the PSID Gini coefficient of household net worth increase of about 
10% between 2007-2011 (Pfeffer et al., 2014, 12). In May 2014, Managing Director of the 
IMF, Christine Lagarde, warned that “the [financial] industry still prizes short-term profit over 
long term prudence” and voiced her concerns that massive banks remain “a major source of 
systemic risk.” (Lagarde, 2014). In summary, a vast number of real-world implications are 
implied with global financial crises, after all, the stakes are tremendous. 	  
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2. Research Context 
 
Introduction 
The integration of the international economy, driven by global demand for goods, capital and 
services, has dramatically changed the traditional economic practices of many societies. The 
increase in capital mobility, derived from financial deregulation and rapid innovations in 
communication and technology, has forced national governments to redefine their national 
economies (Higgott, 1999, 24). The standard neo-classical economic response –globalization 
enhances aggregate welfare for all– has lost its persuasiveness, in other words, securing 
domestic political support for the continued integration into the global economy requires more 
than just the assertion of its economic virtue (Higgott, 1999, 25). The narrow focus on openness 
and growth at the expense of non-economic factors has made economists indifferent to the 
complex and combative politics that have developed in response to globalization. This is not a 
rebuttal of economic theory, rather, it is an assertion of its limits with regard to its explanatory 
power in international economics. Susan Strange has written extensively on these limitations. 
She argues that international economic history has shown that political choices on economic 
policies have rarely been motivated by carefully reasoned assessments of economic costs and 
benefits, but rather by sensitive political aims and fears and sometimes even irrational 
considerations (1970, 309-10). Strange observed, as early as the 1970s, that there are a number 
of key questions in the middle ground between politics and economics that have resulted in 
gaps occupied by popular myth and legend (1970, 311). The field of economics largely ignored 
political factors and IPE neglected to investigate the possibility of a major systemic crisis 
(Krugman, 2009; Cohen, 2009). Consequently, attention to both Economics and IPE is devoted 
in this section.  
 
Economics  
In November 2008, Queen Elizabeth II famously asked economists at the London School of 
Economics if these financial institutions were so large how come everyone missed it? The 
question came to symbolize the widespread view that economists largely failed to predict the 
financial crisis (Helleiner, 2011, 68). Few economists saw the crisis coming, but this predictive 
failure was the unintended consequence of the profession’s blindness to the possibility of 
catastrophic failures in an efficient-market economy. This blindness, in turn, was caused by the 
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retreat from Keynesianism and a return to neoclassicism in Economics over the past half 
century (Krugman, 2009, 3).  
 
The neoclassical revival was led by Milton Friedman, who argued that neoclassical economics 
worked well enough in explaining the real economic functions and initiated the anti-Keynesian 
movement based on assumptions developed during an extended period of subdued inflation 
and mild recessions dubbed the “Great Moderation” (Krugman, 2009, 10-11). Friedman’s 
successors extended his work and developed two closely related hypotheses, which not only 
blinded economists to the possibility of radical system transformations, it also, Krugman 
argues, played a significant role in initially inflating the bubble (2009). Firstly, the “rational 
expectations” hypothesis sees immutable economic laws governing markets. Neoliberals 
rejected that Keynesian policies would work because they believed stimulatory government 
spending would be inflationary. When governments increased their spending, it was argued, 
businesses would follow “rational expectations” and raise prices and wages to prevent an 
increase in employment (Langmore and Fitzgerald, 2009, 40). Secondly, the “efficient market” 
hypothesis, based on the belief that (rational and competitive) financial markets would set 
prices that took account of all available information, argued that there was no point in 
regulating the markets. The “market” knew more than anyone else, and thus, there was no point 
in regulators attempting to prevent or control market imperfections (Langmore and Fitzgerald, 
2009, 40).  
 
Other prominent economists have called attention to the political dimensions leading up to the 
crisis, which in turn has reinvigorated attention to the IPE discipline (Helleiner, 2011, 67). One 
of these economists, Raghuram Rajan –one of a select few to warn about the dangerous levels 
of systemic risk before the crisis– argues that the recent contemporary financial crises cannot 
be explained without devoting considerable attention to political causes, such as the role 
policymakers have played in deregulating the financial markets in the decades leading up to 
the crisis (2010). Moreover, Johnson and Kwak tell us that the big financial institutions have 
accumulated too much political power and must be reduced in size in order to effectively 
address the “too-big-to-fail” problem (2010). Whether the big banks have to be reformed or 
not, more structural problems created the predictive failure. Krugman, and many scholars have 
since followed, identifies economists’ continued belief that their financial models were 
essentially right (even when initial panics erupted) because people making real-world decisions 
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did too. Most prominently the Chairman of the Federal Reserve at the time, Alan Greenspan, 
who strongly encouraged deregulation in the 1990s and early 2000s leading up (and 
contributing) to the financial crisis of 2007-08 (Krugman, 22009, 6).  
 
The post-crisis debate can be summarised in two complementary sets of explanations: (1) 
various market and regulatory failures and, (2) the macroeconomic environment leading up to 
the crisis (Helleiner, 2011). Both sets of explanations are to a certain degree influenced by 
politics, and in any case, political science can offer valuable correctives to economists 
concerned with financial crises. 
 
International Political Economy (IPE) 
Echoing the Queen, Benjamin Cohen sparked a wide-ranging debate in IPE with his critical 
paper The Grave Case of Myopia (2009). Cohen compares the collective failure of IPE scholars 
to imagine the possibility of systemic transformation, with International Relations failure to 
foresee the collapse of the Soviet Union (2009, 436-37). Moreover, Cohen separates the 
American and British Schools of IPE, and directs most of criticisms towards his own side of 
the pond –the American School. The American scholars ignored the possibility that a massive 
systemic change could occur, because they incorrectly correlated the absence of systemic crises 
of previous decades to systemic stability in the status quo (Cohen, 2009, 439). Cohen reserves 
positive comments for his colleagues in Britain, especially the late Susan Strange, who 
repeatedly warned against the rise of unregulated capital markets and the underlying fragility 
of the system in 1998. Despite the British vague and often imprecise predictions, their sense of 
the larger picture cannot be denied and the British did issue ample warnings before the crisis. 
Sadly, the American and British versions of IPE have diverged significantly in recent decades 
and lacks an effective dialogue and it is not inconceivable this had a significant impact in the 
predictive failure.  
 
In response to Cohen’s (2014) article, Mosley and Singer challenged Cohen’s cast of predictive 
failure, arguing foremost that IPE scholars are not principally tasked with predicting financial 
crises or recessions (2009, 420). While this may be true, most scholars, among them Barry 
Eichengreen (2000) and Micheal Bordo (2008), assume that crises are an unavoidable 
concomitant of the operation of international financial markets. Financial markets are markets 
in information and information is by its very nature asymmetric and incomplete, which in turn 
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leads to a boom-bust cycle with recurring crises. Eichengreen argues that this problem is 
especially pervasive in the international sphere, because cultural and physical distance 
exacerbates the information asymmetry (2000, 4-5). Many of the key market and regulatory 
failures that contributed to the financial crisis were identified by IPE scholars: they warned 
about the dangers associated with securitization in the mortgage sector, the risk of relying on 
private credit rating agencies (Büthe and Mattli, 2012), the growing significance of slightly or 
unregulated firms and sectors (Strange, 1998), and the increasing concentration of risk in large 
and interconnected firms to name but a few (Helleiner, 2011, 83-84). Few scholars, however, 
successfully identified the larger structural issues between the economics of macro-level global 
imbalances with the politics of the micro-level market and regulatory failures.   
 
In summary, the purpose of this section is to demonstrate that both IPE and economics have 
largely failed to predict the biggest economic disaster in eighty years, and this can be 
contributed partly to the lack of cross-disciplinary cooperation. While IPE scholars 
increasingly made use of economic theory, after Frieden and Rogowski (1996) showed that 
greater attention to economic theory could produce theoretical and empirical innovation in IPE; 
mainstream economics continued to ignore the implications of power and domestic politics. 
As a result of IPE’s turn to economic theory and method, very little attention has been devoted 
to the role of domestic and international political variables, and perhaps more importantly, it 
has neglected to role of ideas in shaping actors’ identities and behaviour (Walter and Sen, 2009, 
16-22). An active but critical (mutual) engagement between economics and political economy 
is therefore desirable: economics should benefit from IPE’s theoretical and empirical research 
on the role of domestic political actors on the international system, and IPE scholars should 
become more sensitive to the underlying rational assumptions in economic theory they employ 
in own research.  
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3. Conceptualization  
 
Researchers routinely make complex choices about linking concepts to observations, these 
choices raise a fundamental question in social science research: do the observations 
meaningfully capture the ideas contained in the concepts? (Adcock and Collier, 2001, 529). 
This problem is especially pervasive in International Relations, where the relationship between 
domestic politics and the international system is complex since there is causality proceeding in 
both directions (Walter and Sen, 2009, 23). Consequently, a sound operational definition is 
required in order to minimize the possibility of measuring aberrant indicators.  
 
How does Drezner define “the system”, and why does Drezner deem its performance as 
“nimble and effective” (2014, 12)? Regarding the former, Drezner formulates the following 
definition for global economic governance: “the set of formal and informal rules that regulate 
the global economy and the collection of authority relationships that promulgate, coordinate, 
monitor, or enforce said rules.” (2014, 15). Drezner highlights the roles of the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Trade Organization (WTO), the Bank for International 
Settlements (BIS), and the Group of Twenty Nations (G20). Within the framework of global 
economic governance, scholars generally speak of international institutions, usually 
intergovernmental organizations which are comprised of two or more member states, 
established by agreement among national governments and sufficiently institutionalized to 
have some sort of centralized administration with permanent staff; a condition the G20 does 
not satisfy (Gutner and Thompson, 2010, 229-30). Gutner and Thompson also suggest that 
outcome based metrics, measuring macro outcomes, are most appropriate in circumstances 
where the independent international organization plays a dominant role in the international 
regime (2010, 234-36). This bachelor thesis concentrates on the role of the IMF, WTO and BIS 
on global economic stability before, during and after the Global Financial Crisis of 2007-09.  
 
Drezner argues that the burgeoning literature on economic downturns suggest two factors that 
imposed a barrier to a strong recovery during the Great Depression: it was triggered by a 
financial crisis and its global scope. Since WWII, most countries that have been affected by 
financial crisis have usually done so when the rest of the international economy was unaffected. 
This allowed countries to significantly boost their global competitiveness (see for an example 
Malaysia the Asian Crisis) and enhance their recovery. Because this was not the case during 
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the Global Financial Crisis of 2007-08 and the resulting Great Recession, Drezner argues that 
“The proper baseline for comparison is therefore the last severe global financial crisis –the 
Great Depression.” (2014, 53). Drezner rightfully argues the world economy did not collapse, 
an achievement he attributes to the influence of interests, power and ideas. Compared with the 
Great Depression, powerful actors with interests in maintaining the status quo were successful 
in preventing would-be protectionists from consolidating policies (with WTO assistance), 
indeed a valuable lesson learned from the Great Depression. Drezner also emphasises that the 
US continued to exert dominance over the system with a “supportive” Chinese role; contrary 
to the leadership impasse during the Great Depression as put forward by Charles Kindleberger 
(1973). According to Drezner, ideas were perhaps most important because the ideology of free 
trade for instance, continues “to act as a guide for key actors in the post-crisis world” (2014, 
203). This, however, is a key paradox of the book: if the pre-crisis ideologies that contributed 
to the crisis have persisted, then failure to reassess them does not constitute a “working” system 
(Kirshner, 2014).  
 
So what constitutes a valid measurement for assessing the performance of global economic 
governance before, during and after the the Global Financial Crisis of 2007-09? The proper 
baseline for assessing IO performance is, following the framework established by Gutner and 
Thompson (2010), in reference to the IO’s original mission, in this case the mission statement 
publicly available on their respective websites (accessed May 20th, 2017). The WTO’s mission 
is to reduce obstacles to trade and to ensure a level playing field in the pursuit of open borders 
for international trade. The IMF’s primary purpose is to ensure the stability of the international 
monetary system and maintain global trade balance; while the BIS aims at promoting monetary 
and financial stability. Gutner and Thompson further expect that outcome-based metrics are 
most appropriate if the IO plays a fairly autonomous role in a given regime; such is the case 
for our three IOs. 
 
The importance of these institutions has received extensive scholarly attention confirming their 
predominant positions in their respective regimes. Hoekman and Mavroidis (2007) have 
extensively analysed the WTO and conclude the organization to be one of the most important 
international organizations in existence today and is closely connected to the globalization 
trend since the 1950s. Furthermore, Langmore and Fitzgerald (2012) point to its importance in 
global economic governance and Oatley (2015, 22) argues that the WTO is the centre of the 
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world trade system by providing a forum for negotiations, administering the trade agreements 
and providing a mechanism to solve disputes. The IMF, on the other hand, plays a similar 
important role in the sphere of public international finance. Walter and Sen argue that the IMF 
is the most important International Financial Institution (IFI) that can provide short-term 
finance to countries suffering payments problems among many other formal and informal roles 
(2009, 107-08). The BIS is also an IFI, it serves at the pleasure of and is owned by, the central 
banks of the (advanced) world, as well as performing the role of regulating the global credit 
and capital markets through the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). The Bank’s 
main objective is to promote coordination between central banks by providing additional 
resources for international liquidity and facilitating large transactions between member 
governments in addition to the traditional banking and exchange rate functions to ensure 
international financial stability (Kern, 2009).  
 
Taken together, the combined performance of these global economic institutions should have 
resulted in a stable global economy. Individually, the respective international institutions 
should have maintained global openness for international trade (WTO), ensure the stability of 
the international monetary system and prevent trade imbalances (IMF), and promoting 
international monetary and financial stability (BIS). The following section is dedicated to the 
methodology employed in order to test the individual performance of these institutions and 
their combined affect on global economic stability.  
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4. Methodology  
 
In the American School of IPE, methodological designs adhere closely to the norms of 
conventional social science, borrowing in particular from neoclassical economics with its well-
known preference for high powered math and formal statistical techniques (Cohen, 2009, 441). 
Case study methods, however, offer several significant advantages relative to statistical 
methods and are especially useful for documenting processes (Odell, 2001, 170-72). By using 
a combination of qualitative arguments and descriptive statistics, not only do I hope to utilise 
the explanatory strength of both science methods. I also attempt to combine some degree of 
economics with IPE theory, something the British School of IPE and most notably Strange (I 
hope) would approve. 
 
To facilitate this, I argue a disciplined interpretive case study is required to investigate global 
economic governance’ share of responsibility in the global financial disaster and describe the 
actions of the respective institutions during the financial crisis –a major shortcoming of 
Drezner’s analysis. Since Drezner does not test or develop a formal theory, neither will this 
thesis. His central claim, namely “the system worked”, requires a counterfactual only. Drezner 
argued the Great Depression best suited this baseline of comparison. Yet, as demonstrated 
above, the original mission statements of the IMF, WTO and BIS provide a more objective and 
insightful baseline: global economic stability. This is the independent variable in this research 
because the stability of the global economy is, all else being equal, contingent on the 
performance of global economic governance.  
  
The Case 
The crucial case in this bachelor thesis is the Global Financial Crisis of 2007-08. The style is 
reductionist in an effort to pair the messy and complex reality down to the bare essentials 
required for analysis: a narrow focus on three institutions within a broader and interconnected 
framework. The IMF, WTO and BIS, as I have argued elsewhere, play a fairly autonomous 
role in within their regimes, which allows for objective measurements of their respective 
mission statements. The Group of 20 Nations (G20) is excluded due to this conditionality, since 
the G20 has no objectively definable and measurable regime in this context. Despite this, I still 
refer to global economic governance in regard of the IOs.  
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Qualitative sources 
One of if not the most important rule for data collection is to report how the data were created, 
and how the researcher has come to posses them (King and Verba, 1995, 51). This bachelor 
project utilizes a variety of sources, foremost the extensive existing literature on political 
science, economics and IPE. Additionally, speeches by important stakeholders are consulted 
since it can serve as an important window into illustrating the conventional wisdom at a 
particular moment in time. Furthermore, the original mission statements of the various IOs are 
consulted (including the articles of agreement of the IMF) and several global reports published 
by these organizations also contribute to my analysis. 
 
Descriptive statistics 
The dataset used in quantitative descriptive analysis is provided by the IMF World Economic 
Outlook. The IMF’s country classification divides the world into two major groups: emerging 
and developing economies and the advanced economies, while this classification is not based 
on strict social or economic criteria, it provides meaningful classification (IMF, 2017). A 
limitation however, is that it only provides data for member-countries which excludes a few 
(small) economies. This dataset (among other data publications by the IMF) has been used by 
a variety of IPE scholars in recent years, thus confirming their measurement validity (Drezner, 
2014; Eichengreen and O’Rourke, 2009; Almunia et al., 2009). 
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5. Analysis 
 
Introduction 
This section analyses the performance of the WTO, IMF and BIS before, during and after the 
Global Financial Crisis of 2007-08. These institutions were founded on Keynes’s ideas and the 
closely related practice of post-war economic policy known as Keynesianism. The architects 
of the system of global economic governance chose Keynesianism precisely because it 
responded to the lessons of the Great Depression; they understood that unregulated market 
forces would generate considerable economic distress and thus the system was designed to 
protect countries from “unbridled capitalism” (Kirshner, 2014b, 4-5). Yet, by the 1990s 
neoliberalism had become mainstream as rational expectations were embraced by economists 
and politicians alike (Kirshner, 2014b, 6). The rationale for the regimes of the international 
economic institutions rests, as Robert Gilpin (1987) observed, on one particular political order 
and dominant ideology, and after the 1990s this became laissez-faire economics. Neoliberal 
economists advocated a small role for government with limited public expenditure and 
taxation, privatising public enterprises and deregulating the financial and corporate sectors 
(Langmore and Fitzgerald, 2012, 40-41). The abandonment of the liberal foundations on which 
the system of global economic governance was built, and the embrace of neoliberalism in the 
decades that followed, is the underlying explanation for the global financial crisis. This is the 
core argument developed in this analysis, and by extension, also the core argument of this 
bachelor thesis.  
 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
Before 
Many commentators have noted the widespread perception that the 2008 crisis was a direct 
consequence of the neoliberal policies prescribed policymakers and the IMF (Cooper, 2010, 
753-4; Helleiner, 2010). Deregulating financial markets as part of this neoclassical rationale 
has been widely acknowledged to have contributed to the financial crisis. According to 
Kirshner, the IMF aggressively promoted the policies that precipitated the global crisis 
(2014b). During the 1990s and early 2000s, the IMF abandoned is Keynesian charter and 
decided to revise its articles of agreement in pursuit of unrestricted capital flows as a 
precondition of membership, thereby letting go of the Keynesian notion that states would rely 
on some market capital controls (Kirshner, 2014a, 60; Reinhart and Rogoff, 2013).  
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Today, the IMF acknowledges that their macroprudential policies largely failed to prevent the 
build-up of systemic risk and speculative bubbles (Claessens et al., 2010). Related to this, 
another area where the IMF came short was their failure to address the issue of global 
imbalances, which has also widely been recognized to have contributed to the crisis (Helleiner, 
2014, 82-83). The former President of the Federal Reserve, Ben Bernanke (who built his 
academic career studying the Great Depression) said “it is impossible to understand this crisis 
without reference to global imbalances in trade and capital flow that began in the latter half of 
the 1990s.” (Bernanke, 2009). Yet, at the time, Bernanke and others promoted the neoclassical 
ideology that in part made these imbalances possible. Even more consequential: the economic 
assumptions and models underlying policies were not only incorporated by these international 
economic institutions, but were also the basis for the conditionality imposed on countries 
required to borrow from the IMF or World Bank (Langmore and Fitzgerald, 2012, 40).  
 
During 
The IMF has widely been acknowledged to have played a marginal role during the global 
financial crisis. Much has been written on the IMF’s poor performance during the Asian Crisis 
in 1997: the conditionality attached to the IMF loans turned out only to worsen existing 
conditions. Countries wise enough to turn down IMF assistance like Malaysia, fared much 
better than IMF supported countries (Luckhurst, 2012, 754; Stiglitz; 2003, 242). At the onset 
of the twenty-first century, their poor and public performance during the Asian Crisis affected 
their credibility and legitimacy of the IMF before and during the global crisis (Kirshner, 2014a; 
Luckhurst, 2012). Lacking real political power or financial resources, “The Fund” was running 
dry as the subprime crisis developed; only after the G20 tripled the IMF’s resources to $750 
billion could it increase its lending capacity.  
 
The implications are twofold: firstly, this demonstrates how unprepared the IMF (like many 
economists, policymakers and other institutions) was when the US housing market bubble 
burst, and secondly, it illustrates the ad hoc approach adopted once global economy’s rapid 
downfall commenced. Even worse, the rules implemented at the time aggravated the economic 
downturn. The regulations in place required banks to hold more capital in downturns, however, 
banks already faced depleted capital reserves and these policies forced banks to further cut 
back from lending, which in turn worsened the initial shocks to the rest of the global economy 
(Claessens et al. 2010, 23).  
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After 
Adding to this, the austerity measures imposed and promoted by the IMF, and indeed 
implemented by many of the advanced economies, have been empirically proven to have a 
negative impact on GDP growth. Jordá and Taylor find (on average) that state dependent fiscal 
consolidations generate drag on GDP growth: if a 1% fiscal consolidation is imposed in a slum 
then it results in a real GDP loss of around 3.5% over 5 years, compared to 1,8% when austerity 
measures are implemented during a boom (2016, 220). Jordá and Taylor provide more context 
to their results by evaluating the UK austerity programme implemented by the Coalition 
Government after the 2010 elections. The authors find that the austerity programmes had a 
significant contribution to the UK’s second economic slowdown by as much as 3.1% of GDP 
in 2013 (2016, 221). Additionally, their findings suggest even larger austerity impacts than 
IMF studies suggest, since the models utilized by the IMF assume a growing global economy; 
when this is not the case, as is in downturns, austerity measures aggravate economic slumps 
(Jordá and Taylor, 2016, 249). The neoliberal monetary and fiscal policies spearheaded by the 
IMF in Europe, furthermore, lead to disastrous macroeconomic outcomes in the Eurozone 
(Weisbrot, 2016). Generally, in economic downturns austerity only prolongs the recession, as 
has been very clear in the latest decade.  
 
World Trade Organization (WTO) 
Before & during 
The WTO has played a defining role in limiting the extent of protectionist responses. It proved 
to be a sound foundation for the open multilateral trading system that has evolved over the past 
half century. Member states face a significant and enforceable cost when using trade policies 
on account of the effective dispute settlement mechanism imposed by the WTO (Hoekman and 
Mavroidis, 2007). Moreover, the codification of trade law has made it more difficult for 
governments to waive their commitments to openness, even temporarily. Nevertheless, global 
trade suffered a tremendous shock following the crisis in 2009. World trade declined in real 
terms by 12.2 percent fuelled by big drops in commodities prices, but also saw a rapid rebound 
following the stabilization of global GDP growth (Shelburne, 2010, 2-3; see figure 2). On the 
surface, the openness of the global economy seemed under attack: the deadlock in negotiations 
at the Doha Round, the rise of G20 protectionism after the fall 2008 summit, and the the 
explosion of anti-dumping measures imposed after the crisis all pointed to things taking a turn 
for the worse. This was also suggested by economists Chad Bown and Meredith Crowley, who 
argued that the steep economic decline in 2008 and 2009 should have produced an “orgy” of 
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protectionist cases, but instead found, there was almost none (2012). Bown and Crowley 
estimated that, based on pre-crisis evidence, total (non-oil) import protection should have 
decreased by 15%, yet by the end of the recession this had only increased by 1-2% (2012). 
While the authors don’t contribute this positive development exclusively to the WTO, it is 
undeniable that the existence of the WTO, in stark contrast to the 1930s, contributed to 
sustained global openness by preventing “beggar-thy-neighbour” policies that prolonged and 
deepened the Great Depression.  
 
After the dust settled, in 2013, the Centre for Economic Policy Research published the critical 
Global Trade Report in preparation of the G8 Summit in the UK. The report warned that the 
protectionist threat was greater than at any time since the onset of the global financial crisis 
and, interestingly, found that the world’s most protectionist nations are more often than not, 
also the world’s largest economies (Evenett, 2013). Additionally, the European Commission 
finds that, since 2008, the number of trade-restrictive measures directed at the European bloc 
has continued to increase up to 879 relevant measures (2016, 4). Their findings have been 
largely confirmed in the biannual WTO report on protectionist measures adopted by G20 
countries (2016) and point towards a larger and more worrying trend in the last couple of years. 
Creative governments have found ways to routinely circumvent WTO rules in order to favour 
domestic interests without provoking their trading partners (Evenett, 2013). These 
governments don’t openly dispute WTO rules, instead, they used the wiggle room in existing 
agreements to put forward policies not disciplined by multilateral trade rules. The European 
Commission identifies a significant increase in the number of measures applied “behind the 
border”, this suggests countries’ greater reliance on internal measures restricting foreign 
competition, which are often more difficult to tackle than traditional border measures that are 
codified in the WTO agreements (2016, 6).  
 
Regardless, in light of the WTO’s explicit mission statement, the institution has managed to 
maintain open borders and cross-national trade flows at the crucial time following the onset of 
the global crisis. In this sense, the WTO has performed their most fundamental mission to keep 
borders open to international trade, successfully. Nevertheless, as many economic reports and 
academic papers suggest, protectionism is on the rise.  
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Bank for International Settlements (BIS) 
Before 
The Bank for International Settlements and its various committees, most notably the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), has a mandate to promote international co-
operation on monetary and financial issues in pursuit of international monetary stability 
(Griffith-Jones and Kimmis, 1999). Intensified coordination between central banks in the 
1980s, positioned the BIS as the leading regulatory authority of the global financial markets 
(Andersson, 2015, 204-05). During the 1990s, conventional wisdom perceived the 
international financial system to be secure and stable: it was regulated at the national level by 
central banks and other regulatory agencies, and at the international level by cooperative 
accords reached through the BCBS and the IMF (Strange, 1998). Yet, the globalization of 
finance poked massive holes in the national regulatory systems, and bankers being bankers, 
were quick to exploit these loopholes, often referred to as “regulatory arbitrage”.  
 
In a landmark decision, founded on the misplaced neoliberal ideology that private markets 
would take care of risk regulation on their own, the BIS then decided to abandon its efforts to 
impose common capital and loan rations on banks worldwide in 1996. Instead, the BIS decided 
to leave risk-management to the banks themselves, effectively resulting in an information-
dependence on the banks that very system was supposed to regulate (Strange, 1998). In the 
years following the turn of the twenty-first century several observers (the BIS among them) 
had called attention to the underlying mechanisms contributing to the build-up of systemic risk 
and global imbalances (BIS, 2005, 2006; Knight, 2007). Sustained and rapid global growth of 
credit and asset prices, exceptionally low risk and increasing asset volatility, were identified 
well before the crisis and, in hindsight, proved unmistakable symptoms. Unfortunately, these 
issues were not effectively addressed and several factors contributed to this failure, including 
the influence of the private financial industry. Ozgercin for instance, demonstrated how the 
electorate of member state governments is largely shut out from BIS cooperation by private 
financial actors (2012). The BIS was best equipped to regulate the global markets, however, 
clouded by neoclassical assumptions about the self-regulatory capacities of the financial 
system they failed in ensuring the stability of the international financial markets.  
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During & after 
At the onset of the global financial crisis, the existing regulatory framework (Basel II) only 
exacerbated the instability of the international financial system. The one-dimensional approach 
of rigidly focussing on capital adequacy requirements (to address the solvency risk of banks), 
has been insufficient in terms of ensuring resilience of the financial system (Krug et al., 2015, 
1917-18). Achieving financial stability is the crucial precondition for overall macroeconomic 
stability, but the existing regulatory framework under Basel II disregarded liquidity and 
contagion risk as sources for systemic risk (Arnold et al., 2012). Additionally, under Basel II, 
capital requirements for banks was calculated based on the banks’ own models, incorporating 
the inherently pro-cyclical nature of bank lending into bank regulation, which in turn, 
accentuates the economic downturn (Griffith-Jones, 2009, 4). Despite an impressive level of 
cooperation between leading central banks (US, EU, England and Japan) and the BIS in 
implementing synchronized measures to boost international financial liquidity, this response 
ad hoc and does not present a clear long-term strategy as during the Bretton Woods era 
(Luckhurst, 2012, 746). 
 
The Bank for International Settlements was in the best position to prevent the excessive build-
up of systemic risk. The BIS can get its discourse institutionalized on a natural level, because 
national and politically independent central banks act in accordance with it (Andersson, 2016, 
213). Despite their capabilities, the institutional promise to maintain monetary and fiscal 
stability, and by extension the stability of the global economy, has not been satisfied.  
 
Some figures to back it up 
Drezner readily admits that on any absolute scale, outcomes have been less than might have 
been hoped. Economic growth around the world has been mostly disappointing and the 
advanced economies have only just started recovering –almost a full decade after the US 
subprime mortgage crisis erupted (IMF, 2017). But Drezner rightfully points out, all this 
requires is a counterfactual: compared to what? Indeed, when compared to the Great 
Depression in the 1930s the global economy has rebounded much more quickly than expected; 
but as I have argued elsewhere, the proper counterfactual is established when we test our 
expectations against the mission statements of the three global economic institutions. Yes, 
global economic governance did prevent the crisis from developing into an economic 
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depression as had happened eighty years ago. Yet, as is illustrated by figures 1 to 4 below, it 
was at the expense of a long and global recession, rightfully dubbed the "Great Recession”.    
 
As figure 1 illustrates, global GDP growth has been stuck well below pre-crisis levels. Whilst 
the convincing argument can be made that pre-crisis levels of growth were unsustainable 
exactly because it resulted in the build-up of systemic risk, the figure above does not 
illustrate a trend that signifies a healthy economic recovery. This is also backed up by the 
industrial production levels; after suffering a huge drop in the wake of the financial crisis and 
some degree of recovery leading up to can be observed up to 2014. But it the speed did not 
pick up and since then, the global economy has struggled to maintain a consecutives years of 
industrial growth (see figure 4). 
 
Global imports (figure 2) have the most application to the WTO and the trend appears to 
support the notion that while the WTO was successful in keeping the initial barriers to trade 
open. But also illustrated is the fact since 2015, and consistent with reports from the 
European Commission, WTO and G8, that protectionist measures have increased. Mostly 
nontariff barriers, these domestic policies appear to have an affect on global import levels. 
The unemployment rates in the US experienced the most dramatic increase as a result of the 
global crisis, but they do signify an impressive sustained recovery up to today. Figure 3 also 
illustrates, however, delayed unemployment affects in Europe, but also more enduring. I 
would argue that this partially signifies the austerity measures imposed to southern EU-
countries and the more independent austerity measures in Western Europe and the UK. 
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Figure 1: GDP Growth (Global) 
Source: International Financial Statistics (IMF, 2017) 
Figure 2: Global Imports (Global) 
Source: International Financial Statistics (IMF, 2017) 
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Figure 3: Unemployment Rate (Regions) 
Source: International Financial Statistics (IMF, 2017) 
 
 
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Figure 4: Industrial Production (Regions) 
Source: International Financial Statistics (IMF, 2017) 
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6. Discussion 
 
My criticisms of Drezner have taken two forms: first I challenged the measures with which he 
judges success of global economic governance. Second, I showed how even using his own 
metrics his argument largely fails. This has important implications for the future of the 
international financial system because the world economy experienced its most severe financial 
shock since the Great Depression of the 1930s and the deepest economic downturn since 
WWII. Yet the underlying mechanisms that contributed to the global crisis have not been 
systematically reformed (Shelburne, 2010). The Global Financial Crisis of 2007-08 has 
encouraged a broad public rejection of market-based forms of governance associated with 
neoliberalism, whilst at the peak of the financial crisis global economic governance initially 
resorted to neoliberalism (Luckhurst, 2012, 747).  
 
Drezner’s measures for judging global economic governance performance are founded in his 
neoliberal convictions, that is why he dismisses the notion that global economic governance 
should be judged based on the liberal foundations the architects originally implemented. 
However, when judged against a liberal definition of “success”, global economic governance 
performance tells a different story.  
 
The IMF has not succeeded in ensuring the stability of the global economy by allowing the 
build-up of systemic risk and global trade and capital imbalances to develop under the mantra 
of the “Washington Consensus” vis-à-vis neoclassical economics. While the IMF contributed 
to the crisis, their role in stabilizing the global economy once the panics erupted was marginal. 
Contrary to the former, the WTO did not have a significant contribution to the crisis. While it 
could not prevent a massive decline in global output and trade, it did manage to subdue 
protectionism initially. However, on balance one decade later, protectionist measures have 
proliferated, especially domestic nontariff barriers. Finally, the BIS was in the best position to 
regulate the global capital markets through their Basel Committee and central bank network. 
For all that, the BIS almost always adopted the neoliberal policies advocated by the American 
central bankers such as Alan Greenspan or Ben Bernanke. Advocating market fundamentalism 
and free global capital flows, the rationale ensued that markets were best regulated when left 
to its own device. Taken together, the system did little to prevent and indeed at the sime time 
contributed to the global crisis.   
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Yet, as Drezner repeatedly mentions, after the initial panics receded, the ideological attachment 
to neoliberalism persisted because global economic governance functioned properly to 
maintain openness as a result of a routinized behaviour of international institutions (Kirshner, 
2014b). But the policy responses of the IMF, WTO and BIS were hastily enacted ad hoc 
experiments and do not constitute a long-term fiscal and monetary strategy as envisioned by 
the architects in the Bretton Woods era. The architects –most notably Keynes– of the liberal 
system at least tried to forestall global financial crises by imposing comprehensive 
management of key policy variables (to prevent the build-up of systemic risk) designed to 
insulate countries from the bitter winds inherent in unregulated capitalism.  
 
While institutional reforms can be observed in these International institutions, most notably the 
further inclusion of emerging economies, the given persistence of the economic ideas held by 
those who wield the power in these international institutions these reforms are mostly cosmetic 
(Kirshner, 2014b). This presents profoundly important challenges for the future of the global 
economy because global financial crises are detrimental to domestic economies, the 
distribution of wealth and international cooperation. Fortunately, global financial crises are 
extremely rare, the latest is only the third such crisis since the “Long Depression” of 1873-79 
(Shelburne, 2010, 1). But the latest was also by far the costliest, and it has not seen the kind of 
systematic regulatory overhaul as was the case after the Great Depression in the 1930s. That 
system had, while seriously kneecapped by neoclassical reforms, persevered eighty years. Will 
the contemporary system last this long too? Drezner argues that “Going forward, a healthy 
dollop of optimism is in order.” (2014, 191). I seriously doubt it. 
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7. Conclusion 
 
Did “The System” work? 
When studying the Global Financial Crisis of 2007-08 and the responses to the Great 
Recession, a revival of the classical debate on the role and effects of economic policy has 
appeared in economics and political economy. This debate has also come to light in this 
bachelor thesis, the neoclassical market-based forms of governance that have contributed to 
the crisis have become subject to broad public and academic rejection. This suggests that global 
economic governance has not performed effectively leading up to and during the financial 
crisis, wisdom I happen to agree with. Yet, establishing whether or not global governance has 
been successful, only a counterfactual is required. Drezner, a neoliberal, argues the appropriate 
baseline for comparison is the Great Depression. And definitions of what “works” will 
inherently include, either implicitly or explicitly, normative preferences of what it should look 
like. By looking at the original, albeit liberal, mission statements of the IMF, WTO and BIS, I 
have attempted to establish are more appropriate counterfactual. In light of the original mission 
statements, I expected to confirm my central hypothesis that in fact, global economic 
governance has not been effective before, during and after the financial crisis of 2007-08 –an 
expectation I am confident to have confirmed. Therefore, a more fitting title is suggested: “The 
System Barely Worked”.  
 
Limitations 
Yet, there are some important limitations in this bachelor thesis that need to be addressed in 
order to present a necessary point of departure for further research. Firstly, assessing IO 
performance remains a challenging endeavour. Good performance is often difficult to judge 
because IO sometimes have multiple objectives, leading to the “eye of the beholder” problem 
when it comes to evaluating performance. Secondly, the relative anarchy of the international 
political system means an IO is often limited by states and private actors who share 
responsibility. Thirdly, the ability of one IO to succeed, is often dependent on the activities of 
other global governance structures that coexist in the same regime. Fourth and finally, the 
absence of several important actors or policies have not been included in my analysis, most 
notably the role of the FED in providing global liquidity flows as a “Lender of Last Resort”; 
the effects of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) to address the subprime mortgage 
crisis in the US. 
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Recommendations 
To conclude this bachelor thesis, I present several suggestions for improving further research 
concerned with global governance, IPE and financial crises. My first recommendation extends 
Benjamin Cohen’s case for the development of a more general, systemic-level theory 
concerning the stability of the global economy. If I might speculate, I would suggest a 
combination of classical liberalism and behavioural economics to better predict market failures 
and prevent regulatory ones. Following this, a second suggestions concerns itself with the field 
of International Political Economy. Susan Strange rightfully noted, the divergence between the 
British and American schools of IPE had affected the predictive power of the study of IPE; 
Google’s algorithms might by a good starting point to bridge this transatlantic divide. Finally, 
arguing Jonathan Kirshner’s suggestion, I would encourage anyone to explore the potential 
links international macroeconomic disarray, affect politics within states. In the interwar years 
in the 1930s it helped empower people or factions that rejected foreign cooperative and 
economic policies –like Donald Trump’s Presidency in the US or the “Brexit” in Europe.  
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